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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a computer chip composed of millions of transistors and hundreds
or even thousands of individually patented inventions. Could just one of those
patented components ever account for the entire economic value of the chip?
Could just one such invention ever account for the entire value of a total
personal computer system-monitor, keyboard, mouse, printer, software, and
all-sold along with the chip? While these questions may seem far-fetched,
they may soon be answered in the affirmative under a U.S. patent law doctrine
known as the "entire market value rule."
The entire market value rule allows for recovery of patent infringement
damages based on the value of an entire product or device containing an
infringing component, rather than on the value of the infringing component
alone, provided that the entire value of the device as a whole is legally
attributable to the patented invention.1 The doctrine can mean the difference
between orders of magnitude in potential patent infringement liability, and yet,
surprisingly, the rule has been largely ignored by scholars of the U.S. patent
system. This Note asks whether the entire market value rule remains a viable
doctrine in a world of increasing technological complexity in which new
products are generally not covered by a single patent, but instead incorporate
many patentable components. While the U.S. patent system was designed
primarily on the premise that new inventions would be covered by a single
patent, recent advances in technology have ushered in an era of unprecedented
complexity and detail in technological innovation. Gone are the days when
inventions were primarily simple mechanical devices.2 Now, the patent system
must adapt to accommodate areas of rapid advancement-such as the
computing and biotechnology industries-where products sold to consumers
consist of numerous components, each of which may itself be a patented
invention.
1. See Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH., 408 F.3d
1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The entire market value rule 'permits recovery of damages
based on the value of the entire apparatus containing several features, where the patent
related feature is the basis for customer demand."' (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
2. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 93 (2002) ("The percentage of mechanical . . . patents
dropped precipitously from the 1970s to the 1990s .... Mechanical patents accounted for
more than half of all patents issued in the 1976-1978 period, but less than a third of those
issued twenty years later.").
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This Note demonstrates that application of the entire market value rule
routinely overcompensates patentees and thereby exacerbates many problems
inherent in the current system for awarding patent infringement damages. It
concludes that the doctrine's current form should be abandoned so that when
calculating infringement damages the infringing device's value must always be
apportioned between value added by the patent at issue and value attributable to
the infringer's own contributions or to the public domain. In addition, it
suggests a number of less drastic patent reform measures that, if adopted, can
easily correct much of the doctrine's current overapplication. Part I introduces
the current state of entire market value rule case law, emphasizing the
expansion of the doctrine over time. It explains that, from its modest origins,
the doctrine has been expanded far beyond the rationales behind its creation.
Part II presents the case for modifying the entire market value rule by
identifying how the doctrine frequently overcompensates patentees compared
to their contributions to society. It first introduces and develops an economic
model that demonstrates the doctrine's overcompensating effect. It then
addresses the negative consequences that result when patents are overvalued.
These consequences include a chilling effect on innovation and increased
incentives for "patent trolling." 3 The Part concludes by explaining how scaling
back the entire market value rule would make the doctrine more predictable and
easily administrable. Part III explores how the entire market value rule will
likely be applied in future patent litigation involving complex electronic
devices. Using a hypothetical infringing personal computer system as a case
study, it explains that while complex devices will likely be aggressively
targeted under current entire market value rule case law, scaling back the
doctrine would largely eliminate its overapplication in this beneficial area.
Drawing on the economic model introduced in Part II, Part IV suggests patent
reform measures that can help counteract the overapplication of the entire
market value rule and the problems caused by the overvaluation of patented
inventions.
I. PATENT DAMAGES FOR COMPONENT INVENTIONS
The determination of damages for patent infringement is "not an exact
science."4 Section 284 of the United States Patent Act authorizes a patentee
who successfully proves that its patent has been infringed to recover profits lost
due to the infringer's unlawful conduct, "but in no event less than a reasonable
3. "Patent trolling" is, generally speaking, the practice of using patents not as a tool for
producing and selling goods but, instead, for obtaining licensing fees from potential
infringers. See generally Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in
the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 343-47
(2006).
4. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
October 2007]
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royalty" for use of the patented invention. 5 An award for infringement under
section 284 is intended to provide a patentee with "damages adequate to
compensate" for the injury it sustained as a result of the infringement.6
A. General Standards for Patent Infringement Damages
A patentee's compensation may be comprised of an award for lost profits,
a reasonable royalty, or a combination thereof.7 Lost profits, however, can be
hard to show. To obtain lost profits under Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, Inc., a patentee must show: (i) consumer demand for the patented
product, (ii) sufficient marketing and manufacturing capacity to exploit that
demand, (iii) an absence of noninfringing substitutes, and (iv) the dollar
amount of profit that it would have made from additional sales absent
infringement.
8
Patentees who cannot meet the Panduit test or who do not sell products
covered by their patents may not recover lost profits. Such patent owners are
only entitled to the reasonable royalty for which the infringer could have
licensed the patent at issue. Mathematically, a reasonable royalty award
requires a court to determine first the proper royalty base-the value of the
infringing products or activities for which a royalty is owed-and then multiply
that value by a royalty rate to calculate the total amount of damages. In setting
a reasonable royalty rate for the license of an infringed patent, courts attempt to
reconstruct the hypothetical bargain that the parties would have negotiated at
the time when the infringing conduct began. To accomplish this task, courts
look to a nonexclusive list of fifteen factors first set out in Georgia-Pacific
5. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). In addition to damages, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) permits
courts to grant injunctive relief preventing the infringer from continuing its infringing
activities. While permanent injunctive relief was generally entered as a matter of course
following a finding of infringement, the Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), may make such relief less certain. Further
discussion of injunctive relief, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
7. See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("The Patent Act permits damages awards to encompass both lost profits and a
reasonable royalty on that portion of an infringer's sales not included in the lost profit
calculation.").
8. 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 1157-58 ("A reasonable royalty is an amount 'which a person, desiring to
manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as
a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable
profit."' (quoting Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978,
984 (6th Cir. 1937))). Those familiar with contract law may recognize this expost recreation
of the hypothetical negotiation that the parties would have struck had they bargained as a
form of restitution-style damages. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1078 (3d ed. 2002).
[Vol. 60:263
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Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.'0 In particular, courts rely heavily on
evidence pertaining to the rates at which the patent owner previously licensed
the patented invention."1 This fictitious negotiation is notably distorted from
reality in a number of respects. For example, in reconstructing this ex ante
bargain, courts presume that the patent is valid and covers the infringer's
product 2-facts that were likely not at all clear prior to the resolution of the
infringement suit. Moreover, the very existence of the infringement suit proves
that the parties were in fact not able to strike a bargain prior to infringement or
10. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
roving or tending to prove an established royalty. 2. The rates paid by the licensee
for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit. 3. The nature and
scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive: or as restricted or non-
restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product
may be sold. 4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by
granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 5.
The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as. whether
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business: or whether
they are inventor and promoter. 6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in
promoting sales of other products of the licensee: that existing value of the
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items: and the
extent of such derivative or convoved sales. 7. The duration of the patent and the
term of the license. 8. The established profitability of the product made under the
patent: its commercial success: and its current popularity. 9. The utility and
advantages of the patent propertv over the old modes or devices, if any, that had
been used for working out similar results. 10. The nature of the patented invention:
the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the
licensor: and the benefits to those who have used the invention. 11. The extent to
which the infringer has made use of the invention: and any evidence probative of
the value of that use. 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may
be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for
the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 13. The portion of the realizable
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-vatented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer. 14. The opinion testimony of oualified
experts. 15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement: that is. the
amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented
invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a
reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent
patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Id.
11. See, e.g., T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (unpublished table decision) ("Proof of an established royalty for the patent in suit is
indeed one of the strongest measures of a reasonable royalty.").
12. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 229-30 (2005) ("[F]or purposes of these
hypothetical negotiations, the patent is presumed to be valid and the defendant's proposed
use infringing .... "); 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[3][a] (7th ed.
2002) ("The [hypothetical reasonable royalty] negotiation is based on the assumption that the
patent was valid."); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1535 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) ("[T]he patentee is presumed to know that the patent is valid and infringed.").
October 2007]
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at any time afterwards. While counterfactual, these considerations may be
necessary to avoid undercompensation. 13
B. The Apportionment Requirement
Once the finder of fact has decided to award monetary damages, it must
determine what compensation base to use in calculating the patentee's lost
profits or the reasonable royalty owed by the infringer. When a patent covers an
entire infringing product, the royalty base is simply the total value of the sales
or uses of the infringing product. 14 However, when the patent at issue covers
only a component of or improvement to the infringing item, the value of the
sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented invention
and the remaining unpatented 15 components. 16 This requirement ensures that a
patentee is normally awarded damages in proportion to the value that its patent
contributed to the infringing article, and not based on any value attributable to
the infringer's own inventions or the prior art.
Courts have long recognized that damages awards should differ depending
on whether the patent at issue covers the entire infringing product or instead
covers only a component of or improvement to the infringing product. In
Seymour v. McCormick, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an
award for infringement of an improvement patent based on the value of an
entire machine including the improvement, stating that "it is a very grave error
to instruct a jury that as to the measure of damages the same rule is to govern,
whether the patent covers an entire machine or an improvement on a
machine."' 17 The Court recognized that if patent damages were not calculated
after apportioning value between the patented invention and the prior art, "the
13. BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 12, at 230 ("The presumption [that the patent at issue
is valid in the hypothetical negotiation] nevertheless makes economic sense, because an
award that reflected the parties' uncertainty at the time of the hypothetical negotiations in
effect would require the plaintiff to bear the risk of uncertainty twice: first, at the time of
those negotiations, and second when deciding whether to proceed to trial.").
14. See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. CV-00-20905 RMW,
2006 WL 1991760, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2006) (stating that the royalty base was
given by the parties' stipulation of the amount of total sales of the accused products).
15. Here, the term "unpatented" is meant to convey that the components are not
covered by the patent at issue in the case-not that they are completely unpatented. This
convention is also followed in the case law. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explicitly defining "unpatented" as "not covered by the patent in
suit"); see also Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH., 408 F.3d
1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the entire market value rule in terms of a patented
feature sold along with "unpatented components" even though the plaintiff sought to recover
damages under the doctrine based on laundry machine components, some of which were
almost certainly independently patented). Components of a complex device may, of course,
be covered by a multitude of patents. The practical effects of this fact are addressed below in
Part lI.B.2's discussion of "royalty stacking."
16. See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1853).
17. Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 60:263
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unfortunate mechanic [who sells a complex device] may be compelled to pay
treble his whole profits to each of a dozen or more several inventors of some
small improvement in the [device] he has built."' 18
C. The Evolution of the Entire Market Value Rule
Under certain circumstances, however, patent law allows the patentee of an
invention comprising only a component of or improvement to a larger article to
recover lost profit or reasonable royalty damages based on the value of the
entire infringing article. 19 This exception to the requirement of apportionment
is known as the "entire market value rule."
20
As originally conceived, the entire market value rule was not so much an
exception to the apportionment requirement as a term of art used to explain
away the need for apportionment when a patented component accounted for the
entire value of a larger infringing item.2 1 In such a scenario, apportionment is
not necessary because the entire value of the sales or uses of the infringing
article is attributable to the patented invention. The doctrine traces its roots
back to Garretson v. Clark, in which the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly
suggested that such a rule might exist, while actually emphasizing the need to
apportion damages. 22 The Court first stressed the need for apportionment,
stating that "[w]hen a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new
machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his
improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or contrivance . . .
[and] separate its results distinctly from those of the other parts, so that the
18. Id. at 490. In this passage, the Court recognizes the possibility of what is
commonly referred to as "royalty stacking." This idea is explored in detail by Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro in Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991
(2007), and discussed infra Part II.B.2.
19. The entire market value rule may apply in both reasonable royalty and lost profits
patent infringement damages computations. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549 (explaining that the
entire market value rule may apply "whether for reasonable royalty purposes, or for lost
profits purposes" (internal citations omitted)); see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang,
Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he entire market value rule [is] a principle of
patent damages that define[s] a patentee's ability to recover lost profits .... " (emphasis
added)); Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("In determining the
appropriate basis for calculating a royalty base the court may use the 'entire market value
rule."' (quoting Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added)).
20. See, e.g., Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 973 (9th Cir.
1981) ("[T]he entire market value rule ... is itself an exception to the more general rule that,
where the patent creates only part of the profits, damages are limited to that part of the
profits, which must be apportioned as between those created by the patent and those not so
created.").
21. For further information on the history of apportionment, the entire market value
rule, and legal standards for calculating reasonable royalty awards, see Landers, supra note
3, at 354-62.
22. 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
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benefits derived from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated., 23 Only then
did the Court go on to favorably quote the opinion below:
The patentee ...must in every case give evidence tending to separate or
apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages between the
patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be
reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show, by
equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to
be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the
whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to
the patented feature.
24
Thus, in Garretson the Court merely acknowledged that to properly award
damages, the value of the patented invention must be dissociated from the
value of the unpatented components of the infringing article or the patented
invention must be shown to account for the entire market demand for the
infringing article. Accordingly, at the time of its formulation, the "entire market
value rule" simply allowed a patentee whose patent covered only a component
of or improvement to an infringing article to recover damages based on the
entire value of that article, provided that the patentee could show that sales of
the article were properly attributable to the patented invention alone.
Soon after, however, courts began to expand the entire market value rule
from its role as a special case of the rule of apportionment into a full-fledged
exception to the apportionment requirement. In Westinghouse Electric &
Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufacturing Co., for example, the
Supreme Court incorporated the entire market value rule into a burden-shifting
framework for proving damages, ruling that if apportionment was "impossible"
the doctrine should be applied to award damages based on the value of the
whole infringing article.25 While this framework for damages calculation was
ultimately abandoned after the enactment of section 284,26 the Court openly
displayed a willingness to allow for the compensation of patentees beyond the
proven value of their inventions.
Despite attempts to lessen the burden of apportionment, application of the
entire market value rule remained firmly tethered to the market demand
attributable to the patented invention into the 1980s. In Leesona Corp. v.
United States, for example, the Court of Claims reiterated that under the entire
market value rule the determining factor in inclusion or exclusion from the
compensation base is the "financial and marketing dependence [of the
unpatented components] on the patented item." 27 In Leesona, the court awarded
damages based on the entire value of a portable, rechargeable battery system,
23. Id. at 121.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. 225 U.S. 604, 620-22 (1912).
26. See Landers, supra note 3, at 322.
27. 599 F.2d 958, 974 (Ct. CI. 1979).
[Vol. 60:263
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including unpatented anodes, cathodes, and battery covers. 28 The court agreed
with the patentee that these unpatented items "derive[d] their utility and value
from the patented invention."
29
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Federal Circuit significantly
expanded application of the entire market value rule beyond the ambit of
consumer demand for a single, discrete device to allow for the recovery of
damages based on any functionally related items foreseeably sold along with
infringing articles. In Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics
Corp., the Federal Circuit awarded damages based on the entire value of high-
speed paper-winding equipment, including unpatented "auxiliary equipment,"
even though the auxiliary devices were not physically connected to the accused
machine and each of the unpatented devices had a separate use and therefore
value independent of the patent at issue. 30 Signaling a change in entire market
value rule jurisprudence, the court held that "the deciding factor" in application
of the entire market value rule was no longer consumer demand but instead
"whether '[n]ormally the patentee (or its licensee) can anticipate sale of such
unpatented components as well as of the patented' ones." 3 1 Relying on
evidence that consumers in the paper-winding industry routinely purchased
entire sets of rewinder equipment from a single source, the court awarded the
patentee damages on the entire set of infringing devices sold by the infringer.
32
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., the Federal Circuit first enunciated the
current standard for the entire market value rule.33 The court created a
"functional unit test" under which the entire market value rule may be invoked
to award damages based on any components of an accused device-even those
not physically connected to the infringing component-so long as they function
together with the patented invention as part of a single "functional unit."
34
Since Rite-Hite, courts have frequently applied the entire market value rule to
award damages for components that are unconnected to the infringing element
of the accused device, yet which nevertheless function together with the
accused device and are sold or marketed in conjunction with the infringing
article. 3
5
28. Id. at 975-76.
29. Id. at 973.
30. 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
31. Id. (quoting Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).
32. Id.
33. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 1550.
35. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (allowing damages award for lost profits on sale of syrup used in patented juice
dispenser); Paper Converting Mach., 745 F.2d at 23 (affirming damages award based on
separate auxiliary equipment sold as part of a line of paper-winding products).
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II. THE CASE FOR MODIFYING THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE
As a result of its expansion into a broad exception to the general rule of
apportionment, the entire market value rule often overcompensates patentees
through excessive awards of patent infringement damages. Using an economic
model, this Part demonstrates that application of the entire market value rule
overcompensates patentees unless the patent at issue accounts for the entire
value of the accused product to the infringing firm.3 6 When the doctrine is
applied but the patent at issue accounts for less than this entire value, patentees
are awarded for value they did not create.3 7 This overcompensation results in
socially undesirable consequences such as reduced incentives for investment in
beneficial technology, increased risk of royalty stacking, and increased
incentive for patent trolling. To prevent overcompensation and its attendant
harms, the entire market value rule must be scaled back to its original role as a
special case of the apportionment requirement, such that it may not be applied
unless-as its name suggests-the patent at issue indeed accounts for the entire
value of the infringing article. Furthermore, using the developed model, this
Part concludes that modification of the doctrine would have the added benefit
of making the doctrine more predictable and easier for the Federal Circuit to
review on appeal.
A. An Economic Model of Patentee Compensation3 8
Now that we have seen how courts have expanded the entire market value
rule over time, this Part demonstrates that, as a result, the doctrine routinely
overcompensates patentees relative to their inventive contribution to society.
This subpart introduces an economic model with which we can observe and
measure this overcompensating effect in reasonable royalty awards.
39
36. Here, and throughout this Article, the phrase "entire value to the infringing firm"
(or "entire market/consumer demand") should be read to mean the total value of the accused
device to the infringing firm less the value of the next best noninfringing alternative-or, in
other words, the entire value added by the accused device above its closest substitute.
37. See Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENY. U. L. REv. 199, 256 (2006) ("[T]he
trend over the past several years has been to award more of the infringer's innovative
activity to the patentee .... In part, this has been because the court has expanded the 'entire
market value' rule.").
38. This Part draws heavily from the economic model introduced in Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1995-98. See also Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent
Royalties (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Shapiro (deriving the equations relied upon by Lemley and
Shapiro).
39. While this economic model addresses only overcompensation resulting from
application of the entire market value rule in the reasonable royalty context, the doctrine also
routinely overcompensates patentees when used to award damages for lost profits on entire
accused devices. This Part demonstrates that it is economically unsound to award a patentee
a royalty for the use of value that the patentee did not create. Thus, it is similarly unsound to
[Vol. 60:263
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1. A benchmark royalty level
To determine whether the entire market value rule overvalues patents, we
must first set a benchmark for the socially desirable level of compensation.
According to Lemley and Shapiro, the benchmark reasonable royalty-the
royalty reward "that would be reasonable and expected in the ideal patent
system without any element of hold-up"4°-in a patent infringement suit is
given by the formula
B*V [(1)]
where B represents the relative bargaining power between the parties and
V represents the value of the patented invention to the infringing firm-i.e., the
total value per unit of the patented invention to the infringing firm less the
value of the next best noninfringing alternative.4 1 This benchmark thus
provides that, in an ideal system in which damages are awarded based on the
royalty bargain that the patentee and infringer would have struck at the time of
infringement, we would expect the parties to divide the economic surplus
created by the patented invention.
4 2
award a patentee profits earned from value it did not create. For simplicity, and because
reasonable royalty damage awards are far more common than lost profits awards, the
following analysis will focus on overcompensation in the reasonable royalty context.
40. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1999.
41. More specifically, the Lemley-Shapiro benchmark royalty is given by the equation
O*B*V, where e represents the probability that the patent will be found valid and infringed
in litigation (i.e., the patent strength). Id. at 1999-2000. This additional term takes into
account the fact that in a true bargain struck between the parties at the time of infringement,
the negotiated royalty rate will be discounted by the estimated strength of the patent at issue.
Id. In the following analysis, we drop the patent strength term because patent infringement
damages are calculated after the patent has been proven valid and infringed such that 0 = 1.
42. While, in practice, courts typically announce reasonable royalty awards as a
percentage royalty on the total price of the accused product, the most logical way to calculate
a reasonable royalty award is to first consider the value added by the patented component
and then divide that value between the patentee and the infringer. For example, assume that
the margin that can be earned on the sale of a complex product is $50 and that the value
added to the product by the patented invention is $5, such that if the product were sold
without the invention the margin would only be $45. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18,
at 2021 (explaining a similar example). Since a reasonable royalty is principally based on the
ex ante license that the parties would have struck before infringement, the royalty is given by
the negotiated division of the $5 surplus created by the invention. With equal bargaining
power, for example, the parties would divide this surplus in half. The resulting reasonable
royalty would then be $2.50. Assuming that the total price (margin plus costs) of the
complex product is $150, the royalty could be equivalently stated as a 1.667 percent royalty
on the price of the accused product. For a similar non-numerical example, see BLAIR &
COTTER, supra note 12, at 215-17. For a more technical exploration of calculating reasonable
royalty awards, see Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable
Royalty: Simplification and Extension of the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 555 (2003).
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2. Deriving a benchmark royalty levelfor an entire complex device
Building upon the Lemley-Shapiro benchmark model, we can demonstrate
mathematically when application of the entire market value rule makes
economic sense. This Part proves that a reasonable royalty award based on the
margin M of the entire product less the value A of the next best alternative to
the entire product 43 is the proper benchmark measure of damages under the
rule, and that such an award only makes sense when the patent at issue truly
accounts for the entire value of the accused product to the infringing firm. This
analysis further demonstrates that for the entire market value rule to be applied
at the benchmark level two conditions must be satisfied: (i) all unpatented
components of the accused device must have zero value independent of the
infringing component, and (ii) the patented invention itself must not have a
reasonable alternative.
Application of the entire market value rule to award patent infringement
damages based on an entire product is equivalent to awarding damages for
infringement of a hypothetical patent covering the entire product.44 Thus, when
a reasonable royalty measure of damages is awarded based on an entire
complex device, the resulting benchmark royalty under the Lemley-Shapiro
model is B*VEMVR, where VEMVR is the value per unit to the infringing firm of a
hypothetical patent covering the entire accused device. Specifically, VEMVR is
the total value of the entire device to the infringer-i.e., the margin (M) earned
on each unit-less the value of the next best alternative (A). Thus,
B*VEMVR = B*(M - A) [(2)]
This makes sense because, when a patent covers an entire device (or
equivalently when a patented component truly accounts for the entire consumer
demand for a complex product), the infringer will not be able to realize any
value from the accused product without the patented subject matter. As a result,
in reconstructing the bargain that the parties would have struck at the time of
infringement, the infringer would be willing to pay a royalty amount up to the
total value added by the patent.
Next, because we can view a royalty payment for a license to use a
complex device as a summation of royalties paid to license each individual
component of that device, 45 we can see that VEMVR is also given by the
summation of the total value per unit (or margin per unit) to the infringing firm
43. The next best alternative to the entire product should not be confused with the next
best alternative to the patented invention, which, as we shall see infra at Part II.A.3, cannot
exist when the entire market value rule is applied in an economically sound manner.
44. Cf Landers, supra note 3, at 362.
45. This makes sense because, intuitively, the value of a complex device is a linear
combination of the values of its component parts.
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of each component of the entire infringing product (m,) less the next best
noninfringing alternative for each component (ai) such that, where N is the total
number of components of which the accused device is comprised,
N
B*VEMVR = B*(M - A) = B* Z (in, - a1) [(3)]
i=I
Since we know from the Lemley-Shapiro formulation that by definition the
total value of each component less the value of its next best alternative equals
the value (vi) of that component to the infringing firm, VEMVR is also given by
the summation of the values per unit to the infringing firm of each component
of the entire infringing product such that
N N
B*VEMVR = B* Z (mi - a.) = B* v, [(4)]
i=1 t=I
Thus, we can see that the benchmark royalty for an entire complex product
is given by the negotiated division of the margin per unit less the next best
alternative for the product or, equivalently, the summation of the values to the
infringing firm of each component of the infringing device. Substituting in the
value of the patent at issue (vp) for the value of the hypothetical all-
encompassing patent (VEMVR) we get
NB*vp = B*(M - A) = B* v. ((5)]
Therefore, when the entire market value rule is applied to award reasonable
royalty damages based on an entire accused device including an infringing
component, the benchmark royalty will only be achieved if the infringing
component accounts for the entire value of the accused product to the
infringing firm across all components, such that the patent accounts for the
entire margin per unit of the accused device above the value of its next best
alternative. This result confirms the economic rationale behind the creation of
the entire market value rule-namely, that when a patented component
accounts for the entire market demand for a product, and thereby is the sole
reason why a consumer would purchase the accused device over its next best
alternative, the patentee deserves to be compensated based on the entire value
of the product.4 6 In other words, this analysis confirms that application of the
46. Thus, when applied in an economically rational manner, the entire market value
rule comes into play only when the value added by the patented invention equals the total
margin earned on the sale of the accused product. Accord BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 12, at
216-17. For example, assume that the value added to an accused complex product by a
patented invention is $50, which also equals the total margin earned on the sale of the entire
product. In this case, the infringer cannot sell the product without including the invention. As
a result, we would expect the patentee and infringer to negotiate a license dividing the entire
$50 margin. With equal bargaining power, for example, the parties would split the margin. In
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doctrine makes sense only when the value of the patented component drives the
sale of the entire infringing product.
3. Two conditions for benchmark level compensation
This economic model also shows that the existence of two conditions
(which are generally readily provable by various means discussed below in Part
IV) can help determine whether or not the doctrine may be applied in a given
case without overcompensation. First, we can see that when the entire market
value rule is applied at the benchmark level-i.e., when the patented
component accounts for the entire value to the infringing firm of the entire
product-no other component of the product can have any independent value.
4 7
The model shows that the benchmark is only achieved when vi = 0 for all
unpatented components (i f p), such that
N
B*vp = B* Zv = Z [ " 0, 0, 0, vp, 0, 0 .... ] [(6)]
As a result, application of the entire market value rule will result in
overcompensation if even one unpatented component of the accused device can
be shown to have independent economic value above its next best alternative. If
any components of the product have independent value, vp must be less than the
value of the accused device to the infringing firm (M - A),48 and, as a result,
the patentee will be overcompensated by a damages award based on the entire
value of the accused product.
Second, given that no other components may have independent value to the
infringer when the doctrine is applied at the benchmark level,4 9 it follows that
the patented component cannot have a reasonable alternative that could readily
be combined with the remaining unpatented components of the accused device
to create a "new" next best alternative. If such an alternative did exist, the
unpatented components would have independent value because they could be
used in combination with the substitute invention. Thus, if the patented
that case, the resulting reasonable royalty amount would be $25 per unit.
47. The Federal Circuit has recognized this result in a number of cases. See Kori Corp.
v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
the entire market value rule is properly applied when the unpatented features cannot be sold
or used without the patented feature); see also State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883
F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But cf Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d
1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the entire market value rule to allow damages based
on sales of syrup used in a patented juice dispenser even though "other dispensers could use
Juicy Whip's syrups"). However, it has never been used to overturn or rebut an entire market
value rule damages claim.
48. See Equation (2) supra.
49. See Equation (6) supra.
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invention has even one such reasonable alternative, application of the entire
market value rule will result in overcompensation.
In combination, these conditions will rarely be satisfied. However, entire
market value rule case law shows that the Federal Circuit nonetheless routinely
affirms damages awards granted under the doctrine despite clear evidence that
unpatented components have independent value or that reasonable alternatives
exist for the patented invention.
Several cases demonstrate that courts are willing to invoke the entire
market value rule when unpatented components of the accused device have
independent economic value. In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., for
example, the Federal Circuit ruled that the patentee could move forward on an
entire market value rule theory of damages to recover for lost sales of
unpatented syrup used in conjunction with a patented juice dispenser despite
the fact that "other dispensers could use Juicy Whip's syrups." 5° The court thus
approved application of the doctrine even though the unpatented syrups could
be sold apart from the patented invention for use in alternative dispensers.
Similarly, in Paper Converting Machine, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
damages award based on a whole line of paper-winding products including
unpatented auxiliary equipment despite the fact that the auxiliary devices were
not "integral parts" of the winder line and in fact "each [had] separate usage." 5 1
Again, the court approved application of the doctrine even though the
unpatented equipment could have been independently sold for use in other
paper-winding lines.
Other cases demonstrate that courts are willing to award damages under the
entire market value rule when the patented component has a reasonable
alternative. In State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., for example,
the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of damages based on an entire insulated
water heating system, which was comprised of unpatented water heaters sold
along with patented foam insulation, despite the fact that other forms of
insulation such as fiberglass were available. 52 Similarly, in Tec Air, Inc. v.
Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury's
damages award based on entire radiator and condenser assemblies sold along
with cooling fans balanced according to a patented method despite the fact that
the defendant continued to sell assemblies successfully after abandoning the
patented balancing method with only a single customer complaint.
53
50. 382 F.3d at 1372.
51. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
52. 883 F.2d 1573, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
53. 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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4. Measuring patentee overcompensation
The economic model described above demonstrates that, to the extent that
a patent does not account for the entire value of the accused product to the
infringer less its next best alternative, application of the entire market value
rule will only serve to overcompensate the patentee by awarding it damages
covering value its invention did not create. Using the economic model, we can
easily measure the magnitude of this overcompensation when it occurs. From
Equations (2) and (4), we know that when the entire market value rule is
applied the patentee is compensated by the amount
NB*(M - A) = B* v, [(7)]
i=1
Subtracting the benchmark royalty (B*vp) from this sum, we are left with
the amount of compensation awarded to the patentee above the benchmark
level. Thus, the model shows that when damages are awarded under the
doctrine that exceed the benchmark royalty, the patentee is overcompensated
by the amount
B*(M A- vp) = B* Z v15 4 [(8)]
I#p
B. Consequences of Patentee Overcompensation
Many socially undesirable effects result when patentees are
overcompensated for their inventive contributions. These effects include
diminished incentive for investment in potentially infringing activities and
increased incentive for patentees to engage in patent trolling. When they arise
in the context of the entire market value rule, these effects become even more
problematic.
1. Decreased incentive for investment in beneficial activities
Allowing patentees to recover damages in excess of the value added by
their patented inventions skews the patent system's balance between
encouraging invention and discouraging potentially infringing commercial
activity. When the entire market value rule is invoked to permit recovery for
the entire value of an infringing product but the patented feature accounts for
only a portion of that value, the patentee's rights have effectively been
54. Subtracting the benchmark royalty, B*vp, from (2) we get: B*(M - A) - B*vp =
N
B*(M - A - vp). Subtracting from (4) we get: B* v, - B*vp = B* 1 v,.
i=4 i#p
[Vol. 60:263
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 278 2007-2008
PA TENTEE 0 VER COMPENSATION
expanded beyond the "metes and bounds" of the claim language. Thus, as
emphasized above, overcompensation is equivalent to overexpansion of patent
rights.
55
When patentees are compensated for more than their invention is worth-
whether the overcompensation results from damage awards or expanded patent
rights-there is a corresponding disincentive for potential infringers to engage
in beneficial5 6 commercial activity.5 7 A higher level of expected infringement
liability effectively raises the potential infringer's marginal cost, which in turn
raises the price of the infringer's products and reduces its level of output. The
result is a deadweight economic loss to society. If the disincentive is large
enough, the potential infringer may be forced to abandon totally what would
otherwise be efficiency-enhancing behavior.
58
In the context of the entire market value rule, the overcompensation of
patentees creates a disincentive for the production of complex products.5 9 This
55. See supra notes 43-44; see also The Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R.
1908 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, I 10th Cong. (Lexis 2007) (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law,
Georgetown Univ. Law Center) ("[W]hen the Entire Market Value Rule effectively becomes
the default damages principle, rather than one that applies under only particular
circumstances, the actual scope of patent protection may greatly exceed the claim scope that
has been sought and obtained."); Eric E. Bensen, Understanding the Federal Circuit on
Patent Damages for Unpatented Spare Parts, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 57, 65 (2002) ("The most
notable expansion of the patent monopoly is the Entire Market Value Rule.").
56. While developing and producing a product that might infringe a patent, an
infringer may, in the process, discover new innovative features. As a result, when potential
infringers engage in inventive activity (rather than leaving the market) the result will be
more innovation overall. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 843-44 (1990) ("[Patent] law should
attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for improvements, rather than an
environment dominated by the pioneer firm ... [because] the efficiency gains from the
pioneer's ability to coordinate are likely to be outweighed by the loss of competition for
improvements to the basic invention.").
57. See Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and
the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 193, 214 (1999) ("If the system
overcompensates the inventor, the protection may actually impede innovation by denying
competitors (and users) access to needed information and basic inventions that could serve
as building blocks for further progress. In short, because competition also plays a role in
fostering innovation, overprotection of a patent holder from competition may perversely
result in less, rather than more, innovation.").
58. A rational producer will cease to produce a potentially infringing product if the
expected cost of patent liability increases to exceed the otherwise expected margin on sales
of the product. See, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in
Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 1, 26-27 (1995) (noting that the specter of patent
infringement liability may cause future innovators to avoid a market for fear that expected
patent licenses will reduce profitability).
59. See The Patent Reform Act of 2007, supra note 55 ("Modem products and
processes commonly embody numerous patented inventions, with some incorporating on the
order of one thousand or more. Overly generous damages awards with respect to just a
fraction of these patents may impose infringement liability upon manufacturers that
dramatically exceeds the profits the infringer made. Such an outcome fails to recognize that
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result is particularly troubling because in our modem technology-centered
society, a large proportion of the most socially beneficial products are complex
devices which may be composed of hundreds or thousands of components. As
Allison and Lemley have noted, "[W]e are in an era of astounding productivity
attributable to technological innovation," particularly due to rapid growth in
industries characterized by technological complexity such as computing,
telecommunications, and biotechnology. The entire market value rule's
inherent overcompensation of patentees thus serves to deter further investment
and innovation in these vital areas.
2. Royalty stacking
In its current form, the entire market value rule also exacerbates the effects
of "royalty stacking." 6 1 This problem arises from the fact that a complex
product constructed from many components may be covered by a number of
patents owned by an equally large number of patentees. As a result, the
producer of such a product may infringe multiple patents and therefore be
required to pay for multiple licenses. To the extent that patent damages rules
allow for the overcompensation of patentees, the infringer faces the prospect of
paying overlapping royalties.
Royalty stacking in the entire market value rule context can be particularly
egregious. For example, if a producer of a complex product has already been
compelled to pay a reasonable royalty to a patentee based on the entire value of
the complex product, the producer has effectively compensated the patentee for
the value contributed by each and every component of that product.6 2 Suppose
that the same producer is subsequently sued for patent infringement by another
patentee claiming that its invention covers an additional feature of the complex
product. Legally, nothing prevents the second patentee from proceeding with
this infringement claim despite the fact that a court has previously ruled that the
first patent accounts for the entire value of the accused product.63 Any
the patent system serves not just to promote innovation, but also to encourage the
dissemination of new products and processes to the marketplace.").
60. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 78, 80.
61. For a detailed analysis of royalty stacking see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18.
N
62. Recall from supra Part II.A that according to Equation (4) B*VEMVR = B* V,.
I-1
N
Dividing each side by the variable B, we are left with VEMVR Y V,.
63. It is not a total solution to this problem to simply preclude further liability after the
entire market value rule has been successfully applied to a device. To the extent that the
second patentee in this hypothetical has a legitimate claim for patent infringement, but is
prevented from recovery because of the earlier award (by, for example, a change in the law),
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additional liability faced by the producer is necessarily duplicative of that
already paid to the patentee who first filed suit.64 Thus, application of the entire
market value rule in situations when the patented invention does not account
for the entire value of the accused product (and the remaining components of
the product are not clearly in the public domain) leaves the producer to face the
prospect of further, duplicative liability down the road.
3. Increased incentive for patent trolling
The overvaluation of patents also has the undesirable consequence of
increasing incentives for firms to engage in "patent trolling." In recent years,
the acquisition of patents for the sole purpose of obtaining license fees and
awards from infringement litigation-rather than for use in the design,
manufacture, or distribution of products-has been an increasingly common
business plan.65 When courts award infringement damages that are greater than
the intrinsic value of the litigated patents, they send the message to patent
owners that aggressive enforcement of their patent rights will be more
profitable than using those inventions to bring products to market.
66
While it may be premature to totally denounce this increased reliance on
patents as "revenue-generating devices, ' 67 many are concerned that patent
trolling has a detrimental effect on innovation in general.68 At the very least,
the patent system effectively only redistributes patent value to patentees who bring suit
quickly. Furthermore, even in the absence of an additional infringement claim, an erroneous
application of the entire market value rule will harm a defendant who owns a second patent
on the accused device or who made unpatentable contributions to the device's value. See
Patent Reform Act of 2007, supra note 55 ("Failure to apportion damages may cause a patent
effectively to cover contributions that lie within the public domain, as well as technology
that has been patented by third parties or even by the infringer."); Landers, supra note 37, at
255 (noting that under current law a patentee can capture substantial value created by the
infringer's efforts, including "the popularity of a product that is due to the infringer's
advertising, development of a market, superior consumer support, the infringer's name or
development of marketing and distribution channels").
64. As introduced supra note 16, the Supreme Court long ago recognized this
possibility in Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490 (1853) (explaining that without
apportionment, "the unfortunate mechanic [who sells a complex device] may be compelled
to pay treble his whole profits to each of a dozen or more several inventors of some small
improvement in the [device] he has built.").
65. See Landers, supra note 3.
66. See, e.g., Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the
United States: Will Increased Patent Infringement Damage Awards Revive the Japanese
Economy?, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309, 365 (2000) (noting that an increase in the size of
patent infringement damage awards may encourage firms to engage in inefficient litigation).
67. Landers, supra note 3, at 345.
68. See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES ASAP, June 24, 2002, at 44
(criticizing the use of patents for generating royalties rather than the creation of "revenue-
generating products"); Erica Wemer, Lawmakers Want "Patent Troll" Crackdown, USA
TODAY, June 9, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-06-09-patent-
trollx.htm? POE=TECISVA ("The broken patent system fight now, and the rise in lawsuits,
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however, as firms move toward increased efforts at licensing, they move away
from increased investment in commercialization and further invention.
4. Overvaluation as a patent infringement deterrent
Further, these negative consequences are not outweighed by any beneficial
deterrent effects that patentee overcompensation might have on potential
infringers. While the goal of patent infringement damages is to compensate
patentees for losses sustained as a result of infringement and not to punish or
deter infringers, 69 inflated damages awards do have at least some potential to
benefit the patent system as a hidden means to deter patent infringement and
thereby reduce the amount of resulting litigation.70 If infringers face no more
than a true reasonable royalty (the license that the companies would have
agreed to prior to infringement) following a patent infringement suit, infringers
will have a strong incentive to eschew ex ante licensing in favor of stealing the
patentee's technology and forcing litigation, the expected cost of which will be
an ex post payout that is less than or equal to the amount that the companies
would have agreed to prior to infringement. 7 1 In other words, if prospective
damages match ex ante license royalties, an infringer has (litigation costs aside)
nothing to lose and everything to gain by forcing litigation. Thus, inflating
damages above the true reasonable royalty level gives infringers an incentive to
license rather than litigate.
There are, however, many reasons to believe that there are no substantial
deterrence-related benefits to be found in the overcompensation of patentees
through excessive reasonable royalty or entire market value rule awards.
Namely, the willfulness doctrine serves to deter the type of conduct described
above. 72 Under the willfulness doctrine, courts may award up to three times the
plaintiffs actual damages if the infringer willfully infringed the patent at
issue. 73 Thus, unscrupulous companies that steal the technology of another
already face the possibility of stiff punishment. Furthermore, it makes no sense
to deter nonwillful infringers who innocently and independently duplicated the
work of the patentee. 74 In particular, there is no reason to think that
has unfortunately discouraged our companies from innovating, and patent trolls are gaming
the system." (quoting Josh Ackil, Vice President of Government Relations, Information
Technology Industry Council)).
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (authorizing courts to award "damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty"); see also
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 2044.
70. See Landers, supra note 3, at 335-40.
71. Id. at 337-38.
72. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 2037.
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); BLAIR & COTrER, supra note 12, at 12.
74. See Landers, supra note 3, at 342 ("[A] deterrence premium should be limited to
circumstances where the infringer should have actually known about the potential for
infringement, as an innocent infringer by definition will not be deterred unless there is some
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overapplication of the entire market value rule is an effective tool for deterring
willful infringement because companies that develop complex products with
hundreds or thousands of components are the least likely to discover ex ante
that they may have innocently infringed an unknown patent.
75
C. Predictability and Ease ofAdministration
Adding to their overcompensating effect, damages awards granted under
the entire market value rule are also exceptionally difficult to challenge on
appeal. As with any patent infringement damages determination, application of
the entire market value rule is ultimately a question of fact for the jury.76 As a
result, the Federal Circuit's hands are procedurally bound when considering
entire market value rule awards entered by lower courts because the Federal
Circuit must affirm these awards unless they are clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, many of the Federal Circuit's most expansive rulings on the entire
market value rule can likely be explained (at least in part) as cases in which the
court felt that it had no choice but to affirm a highly questionable award based
on the procedural posture of the challenge.
77
Thus, in addition to reducing the overvaluation of patents, returning the
doctrine to its original role as a special case of the apportionment requirement
has the added benefit of making erroneous applications of the doctrine easy to
spot on appeal, thereby further reducing overcompensation of patentees by
lower courts or juries that overlook or misunderstand the economics of the
doctrine. If the doctrine were modified so that it were only to apply if the
reason to think it is infringing."); Takenaka, supra note 66, at 364 ("[l]f the
overcompensation scheme is justified by the policy of deterrence, the applicability of the
new provision must be limited to those who willfully infringed patents.").
75. See Landers, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that companies that produce complex
products or that develop technologies surrounded by "patent thickets" may find it "difficult,
if not impossible" to assess whether new products may infringe existing patents).
76. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe amount of a prevailing party's damages is a finding of fact on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, where the
amount is fixed by the court, review is in accordance with the clearly erroneous
standard ... ").
77. The Federal Circuit has affirmed numerous entire market value rule damages
awards based on what can only be described as tenuous evidence relating to the basis of
consumer demand for the accused product. See, e.g., Tee Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich., Inc.,
192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming entire market value rule damages award
based on statements from defendant's internal documents that "the performance and price of
the entire system were paramount to its customers" and a single complaint from a customer
following defendant's abandonment of the patented method); Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
107 F.3d 1543, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming the entire market value rule damages
award based solely on the fact that the defendant's "technical literature of record emphasized
the [patented] feature"). The evidence in these cases nonetheless provided just enough
support to create a not clearly erroneous basis for the jury's decision to apply the entire
market value rule.
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patented component indeed accounted for the entire market demand for the
accused device, a reviewing court could readily overturn awards in cases where
a reasonable juror could not have found that the patented component had no
reasonable alternatives or that all other components lacked independent value
to the infringer. 78 This result would not only cut down on questionable
applications of the doctrine by lower courts, but would also make its
application more objective and predictable.
III. THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE AND COMPLEX ELECTRONIC DEVICES:
A CASE STUDY OF PERSONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Because the entire market value rule's potential impact in patent litigation
is directly related to the level of complexity in the pool of accused devices, the
doctrine's influence will be particularly strong in future patent litigation
involving complex electronic devices such as digital cameras, wireless devices,
and computer systems. This Part applies existing entire market value rule case
law to a hypothetical infringing personal computer system (PC) and shows that
the doctrine is particularly ill-suited for application in the current technological
environment characterized by a high density of common, yet extraordinarily
complex, products. It concludes that a return to original entire market value rule
precedent would likely foreclose the lion's share of the doctrine's
overapplication in this vital sector of the economy.
A. Complex Electronic Devices Under Current Entire Market Value Rule Case
Law
Under current case law, a patentee faces two obstacles in proving that the
entire market value rule should be applied. First, the patentee must show that
any unpatented items in its proposed compensation base are either physically
connected to the infringing component or operate as part of a functional unit
with the infringing component. 7Second, the patentee must show that at least
some threshold amount of market demand for the infringing functional unit is
properly attributable to the patented invention or that the patentee could
reasonably foresee making sales of the unpatented elements of the functional
unit along with the infringing component.
80
78. See supra Part II.A.3 for the derivation of these two conditions of benchmark level
of recovery.
79. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
80. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stressing whether "the patent related feature is the basis for consumer demand' (emphasis
added)); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stressing whether "the patentee (or its licensee) can anticipate sale of such
unpatented components" (emphasis added) (quoting Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552
F.2d 343, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1977))).
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The analysis that follows explores the entire market value rule's
application in a hypothetical patent infringement suit in which a computer
manufacturer is accused of infringing a patent covering a single component of
the microprocessor sold as part of a larger PC system.8 1 A PC offers a
particularly illustrative example because it is comprised of a uniquely diverse
set of components that interconnect in a number of different ways. Generally
speaking, PCs are composed of physically connected components-i.e.,
internal components located inside the computer tower (or equivalent casing)
including microprocessor chips, a motherboard, and the like-as well as an
endless assortment of peripheral products such as monitors, keyboards, mice,
printers, and scanners.
1. The functional unit test under Rite-Hite and Juicy Whip
To obtain damages based on an entire bundled PC system, the patentee will
first need to establish which components of the PC are part of a functional unit
including the accused microprocessor component. In Rite-Hite, the Federal
Circuit held that the entire market value rule may be applied to award damages
based on unpatented components that function together with the patented
invention, but not based on items sold along with the infringing product merely
for "convenience or business advantage." 82 The court ruled that a patented
truck restraint and unpatented dock leveler did not constitute a functional unit
even though the two products were sold together by both the patentee and the
accused infringer. 83 The court found that although the products "may have been
used together, they did not function together to achieve one result and each
could effectively have been used independently of each other."84 The court
attributed the fact that customers frequently ordered both products
81. This hypothetical is inspired in part by Forgent Network's recent efforts to enforce
U.S. Patent No. 4,698,672-a patent that it claims covers the ubiquitous JPEG image
compression format-against dozens of companies that produce products or services related
to digital cameras, scanners, personal computers, and other devices utilizing the JPEG
standard. Forgent's assertion of its alleged patent rights resulted in over $110 million in
licensing revenue, Press Release, Forgent Networks, Forgent Announces '672 Patent
Settlement (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=
75983&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=925001&highlight=-, before the PTO granted the Public
Patent Foundation's request for reexamination and subsequently invalidated the patent's
broadest claims, see Public Patent Foundation: Forget JPEG Related Patent,
http://www.pubpat.org/forgentjpeg.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (linking to the PTO's
grant of Public Patent Foundation's request for reexamination and the office action rejecting
the patent's broadest claims). In November 2006, Forgent announced that it would surrender
all pending infringement claims and no longer seek to assert the patent. Press Release,
Forgent Networks, supra; Press Release, Public Patent Found., JPEG Patent Claim
Surrendered (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.pubpat.org/jpegsurrendered.htm.
82. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550.
83. Id. at 1551.
84. Id.
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simultaneously to a preference for ease in "contracting and construction
scheduling" and to "combination discounts" offered by the sellers, rather than
to any mutual, functional relationship.
85
However, a functional relationship "is not precluded by the fact that the
[patented] device can be used with other materials or that the unpatented
material can be used with other devices." 86 In Juicy Whip, the Federal Circuit
vacated a jury award and remanded for further proceedings because the district
court failed to find a functional relationship between a patented juice dispenser
and unpatented syrup used in the dispenser.87 Despite the fact that "the
dispenser had been sold separately from the syrup on occasion" and that "other
syrups could be used in Juicy Whip's dispenser," the court found the two
products to be "analogous to parts of a single assembly or a complete
machine," functioning together to create the visual appearance of mixing
central to the patented invention.8 8
Thus, under Rite-Hite, at a minimum any computer components physically
connected to the accused chip would be fair game under the entire market value
rule. This would draw the entire contents of the PC tower within the ambit of
recovery. In fact, because Rite-Hite's functional unit test allows the entire
market value rule to apply to components that are not physically connected to
the infringing component, 89 and because, according to Juicy Whip, components
may be included in the compensation base despite having independent uses and
value,90 there is seemingly very little that we can say with certainty would be
excluded. Under existing case law, it is hard to argue that keyboards, monitors,
mice, and even printers, scanners, speakers, software, or external memory
sources cannot be considered part of the functional unit that we call a PC.
Thus, while one can conceive of products that if bundled together with a
PC would not be rightfully considered part of a functional unit with the
computer (perhaps a promotional hat or coffee mug bearing the manufacturer's
logo), all internal computer components and virtually any common peripheral
85. Id.
86. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 1372.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550 ("The [entire market value rule] has been
extended to allow inclusion of physically separate unpatented components normally sold
with the patented components.").
90. Juicy Whip, 382 F.3d at 1372 (finding that district court erred by denying patentee
the opportunity to present evidence on an entire market value rule theory including damages
for syrups that could be used in juice dispensers other than the accused device, and thus had
independent commercial value). Note that by allowing such a result Juicy Whip directly
contradicts one of the conditions of benchmark-level application of the entire market value
rule. As discussed supra in Part II.A.3, if an unpatented component has independent value,
the patented invention cannot account for the entire value of the product to the infringing
firm. As a result, application of the entire market value rule will overcompensate the
patentee by at least the magnitude of that value.
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devices imaginable are likely fair game despite the fact that each may have
independent uses and substantial independent value.
2. Consumer demand and anticipation of sales
Once the patentee has shown which components may be included in the
compensation base, it only bears the burden of showing that the patented
invention accounts for a sufficient amount of consumer demand for the accused
functional unit or, alternatively (and more commonly in recent cases), that it
could reasonably anticipate sales of the unpatented components of the
functional unit.
When attempting to show sufficient consumer demand, patentees benefit
from the fact that the standard in the case law for meeting this requirement has
not been nearly as stringent as the name of the doctrine might suggest. In recent
cases, showing sufficient consumer demand for the patented feature has
primarily been based on: (i) evidence of consumer preference for that feature or
its resulting benefits;9 1 (ii) expert testimony indicating that the feature
improved the remainder of the entire machine in a significant way; 92 or (iii)
evidence indicating that the defendant recognized the value of the feature and
attempted to market its products based on the benefits of the feature. 93 In Tec
Air, for example, the Federal Circuit upheld the application of the entire market
value rule for patented fans included in radiator and condenser assemblies
based on evidence showing that "customers wanted fans that were balanced"
like those produced by the patentee, and that after the infringer abandoned use
of the patented fan "one customer complained and required [the infringer] to
rebalance the fans." 94 Similarly, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Newbridge
Networks Corp., the court rejected the infringer's request for a new trial on
damages when testimony by the patentee's technical manager indicated that a
previous, informal survey of customers showed that the patented feature was
"'a requirement' that customers insist upon." 95 Likewise, in Fonar Corp. v.
General Electric Co., the Federal Circuit upheld a damages award based on an
entire MRI machine when the infringer's technical literature and brochure
emphasized the inclusion of the patented feature.
96
Even if a patentee cannot show a sufficient amount of consumer demand, it
can still show that it could reasonably anticipate sales of the unpatented
elements of the infringing functional unit. In practice, anticipation of sales has
91. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tec Air,
Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92. See, e.g., Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361.
93. See, e.g., id.; Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
94. 192 F.3d at 1362.
95. 168 F. Supp. 2d 181, 262-63 (D. Del. 2001).
96. 107 F.3d at 1552-53.
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been proven by demonstrating that most purchasers of the patentee's invention
purchased the unpatented accessories or additional parts along with the
invention in a single package. 97 In Paper Converting Machine, the Federal
Circuit affirmed an award of damages including compensation based on the
sale of unpatented "auxiliary equipment" along with a patented rewinder
mechanism for the manufacture of paper rolls. 98 Despite acknowledging that
"[n]one of the auxiliary units here are integral parts of the rewinder; rather, they
each have separate usage," the court found the damage award to be appropriate
because "[s]ubstantial evidence showed ... that the entire industry routinely
purchased a complete rewinder line from the seller of the rewinder machine."
99
While it may seem farfetched to suggest that a single microprocessor
component could account for the entire value of a complete PC system-
especially when a PC microprocessor alone may be covered by hundreds or
thousands of patents in addition to the patent at issue 00--current doctrine
makes the patentee's job relatively simple. The patentee need only rely on a
few lines from the infringer's technical or marketing materials praising the
patented feature. 10 1 For example, the infringer need only have touted how fast,
reliable, small, or energy efficient its microprocessors are for an award to be
upheld by the Federal Circuit.
If such a statement is missing, the patentee can still recover based on the
entire PC if it can show that sales of entire PC systems are reasonably
foreseeable in conjunction with sales of microprocessor chips. In practice, the
patentee need only show that customers traditionally purchase entire PC
systems from the same source or that PCs are generally marketed as one total
system. 102 While perhaps not true a decade ago, it is now unquestionably the
customary practice in the computer industry for customers to buy a whole PC
system, including peripherals, from a single manufacturer. One need only visit
the Dell, Gateway, or Apple websites to see that sales of computer chips are




100. Landers, supra note 3, at 341 ("'[S]oftware and computers are examples of
'system' products-they comprise thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of individually
functioning components and features all assembled in a package for a customer. Because
many of these features could be the subjects of a patent, it is often the case that thousands of
patents may be relevant to a particular computer or software product."' (quoting Patent
Quality Improvement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) (statement of Richard J.
Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Computer, Inc., on behalf of the Business Software
Alliance))); see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1992 ("[Mlodem products such as
microprocessors, cell phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens or even
hundreds of different patents.").
101. See, e.g., Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1552-53.
102. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach., 745 F.2d at 23.
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generally bundled with the internal components and peripherals that comprise a
traditional PC system.
B. Complex Electronic Devices Under a Modified Entire Market Value Rule
While this analysis demonstrates that the entire market value rule may be
applied expansively in the area of complex electronic devices, returning the
doctrine to its original role as a special case of the apportionment requirement
would all but preclude its application in the arena of complex electronic
devices. Recall that, as a matter of economics, a single patented component of a
larger product cannot account for the entire value of that product unless the
independent value of each unpatented component is zero and the patented
component itself has no reasonable alternatives.' 0 3 If the entire market value
rule could not be applied without these conditions being satisfied, an
infringement case like the above PC hypothetical would likely come out quite
differently. Due to interoperability standards, essentially any computer
peripheral could be used with any noninfringing PC system. As a result, at least
some components of the PC system could be used apart from the patented chip
component, and thus have independent economic value. Similarly, because the
PC manufacturer could likely switch to another noninfringing chip without
prohibitive cost, the patented invention also has at least some reasonable
alternatives.
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Now that we have seen how the entire market value rule is routinely
applied to reward patentees for value invented by others or present in the prior
art, we look to see how the entire market value rule can be modified to limit its
application to only those circumstances where the patented invention likely
accounts for all of the accused product's value to society. 104 The economic
103. See supra Part II.A.2.
104. If adopted, currently pending legislation promises to offer some defense against
the quiet expansion of the entire market value rule and patent infringement damages in
general. Introduced in April 2007, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.,
proposes to amend, among many other patent law provisions, section 284 by giving courts
more direction in how to calculate patent infringement damages. Notably, the bill states that
courts shall ensure that reasonable royalty damages are based "only [on] that economic value
properly attributable to the patent's specific contribution over the prior art," and further
"shall exclude from the analysis the economic value properly attributable to the prior art, and
other features or improvements, whether or not themselves patented, that contribute
economic value to the infringing product or process." Id. § 5(b)(2). In addition, the proposed
bill would codify a version of the entire market value rule under which a patentee could
recover based on the entire value of the infringing complex product but only after showing
that the infringing component is the "predominant basis for market demand." Id. § 5(b)(3).
While certainly a step in the right direction, these proposals offer an incomplete response to
the expansion of the entire market value rule. In particular, the bill's vague standard for
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analysis presented above suggests that the entire market value rule should be
altogether abandoned, or rather returned to its origin as a special case of the
apportionment requirement, and thus that modem cases like Rite-Hite and Juicy
Whip should be overturned. While this reform would be the most appropriate,
this Part additionally introduces a number of simple reforms that, short of total
abolition, can be adopted to help ensure that damages awards granted under the
entire market value rule better approximate benchmark level compensation.
Specifically, this Part suggests that at a minimum the entire market value rule
should be modified so that an accused infringer may rebut a patentee's claim
that the doctrine applies by showing either that there is a reasonable alternative
to the patented invention or that at least one unpatented component of the
infringing device has independent economic value. Such a framework would
allow accused infringers to present crucial economic evidence that signals
whether overcompensation is likely to result and thus casts doubt on a
patentee's claims to the entire value of the infringing product.
A. Evidence ofAlternative Technologies
A great deal of improper application of the entire market value rule could
be prevented if accused infringers were permitted to offer evidence that the
patented invention at issue had reasonable alternatives as a means to defend
against the doctrine's application. As introduced above, a patented component
cannot account for the entire market demand for a larger product if the
component can be replaced with a reasonable alternative technology. If
alternatives exist, the entire market value for the product is created, at best, by
the genus of alternatives, and not by the specific species over which the
patentee owns exclusive rights. Such a defense would be easy to implement
because courts are already experienced in determining whether products have
reasonable alternatives. In determining lost-profits damages for patent
infringement, courts are often called upon to consider whether the existence of
noninfringing substitutes for the accused invention should reduce the lost
profits award. 10 5 Similarly, antitrust doctrine often calls on courts to define
relevant markets and consider the effect of the substitutability on demand. 
106
Returning to the PC hypothetical, this sort of reform would likely eliminate
the patentee's hopes of recovering damages based on the entire PC. Suppose,
application of the entire market value rule-that the infringing component be the
"predominant basis for market demand," id.-while abandoning the most-expansive
"anticipation of sales" formulation of the doctrine, leaves the door wide open for courts to
continue to award excessive damages under the rule when the infringing component
accounts for far less than the entire value of the accused product.
105. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
106. See, e.g., United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393
(1956); DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1.0,
1.3, 3 (Rev'd ed. 1997).
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for example, that the infringing invention was incorporated in chips
manufactured by Intel but not in chips manufactured by AMD. In this situation,
the accused PC manufacturer could switch to using AMD chips. While the
popularity and usefulness of a PC does substantially derive from a small genus
of inventions (namely the general concept of the transistor or the integrated
circuit), it does not derive from any one specific type of chip. As a result, any
invention not fundamental to all reasonably suitable chips could not possibly
account for the entire market value of an entire computer system.
As a practical example, consider the recent patent litigation involving a
patent purported to cover the popular JPEG image compression algorithm.10 It
is well known that other image compression algorithms exist and are readily
available. Anyone familiar with a PC has likely encountered alternative digital
image compression formats such as TIFF or GIF. 10 8 More importantly, new
wavelet-based image compression algorithms such as JPEG 2000 exist that
may even be superior to the popular JPEG algorithm.' 0 9 Given that PC, camera,
or other electronics manufacturers could reconfigure their devices to utilize
other (perhaps even superior) image compression algorithms, the JPEG
standard cannot account for the entire value of their products. While the general
concept of image compression makes these products practical, the unpatented
electronic components of any accused devices could be successfully used with
other substitute compression algorithms.
107. See supra note 81 for further information on this litigation.
108. TIFF, or "Tagged Image File Format," is an image compression standard first
published in 1986 by Aldus Corporation. ADOBE DEVELOPERS Ass'N, TIFF REViStON 6.0
(1992), available at http://partners.adobe.com/public/developer/en/tiff/TIFF6.pdf. Like the
JPEG standard, TIFF is a popular format for storing high color depth images and is
commonly utilized by image-manipulation applications such as Adobe Photoshop. Tagged
Image File Format, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TaggedImageFileFormat
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007). GIF, or "Graphics Interchange Format," is an 8-bit per pixel
bitmap format introduced in 1987 by CompuServe, Inc. See COMPUSERVE, INC., GRAPHICS
INTERCHANGE FORMAT PROGRAMMING REFERENCE (1990), available at http://www.w3.org/
Graphics/GIF/spec-gif89a.txt. Like JPEG, GIF is used widely on the World Wide Web. See
Graphics Interchange Format, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIF (last visited Mar.
1, 2007). Another common alternative image compression formats is PNG ("Portable
Network Graphics"). See Comparison of Graphics File Formats, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparisonof graphics fileformats (last visited Feb. 27,
2007).
109. JPEG 2000 was developed by the Joint Photographics Expert Group committee as
a replacement for the original JPEG standard. See JPEG 2000,
http://www.jpeg.org/jpeg2000; JPEG 2000, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
JPEG 2000 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). JPEG 2000 offers several advantages over the
original JPEG standard, including higher compression ratios and sophisticated "progressive"
downloads. Id.
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B. Evidence of Consumer Demand
Moreover, accused infringers should be allowed to present evidence
showing consumer demand for unpatented components of the accused product.
As emphasized above, if the accused infringer can demonstrate independent
market demand for these components, the entire market value rule cannot be
applied without resulting in patentee overcompensation.
An easy way to show such demand is to allow the accused infringer to
present evidence, when available, of royalties paid for licenses of patents
covering other components of the accused device. 110 While perhaps not
dispositive, evidence that at least some other market participants found value in
other inventions or components convincingly demonstrates that economic value
exists in other parts of the product.
This sort of information would also help prevent royalty stacking. If the
finder of fact is presented with evidence showing that the accused infringer
licensed multiple patents in order to make the accused device or that other
components of the accused device have previously been accused in prior patent
litigation, awards of overlapping damages will in all likelihood be substantially
reduced.
In addition, this sort of evidence may also help untie the hands of judges
bound by the fact-based nature of this inquiry. If a jury awards damages under
the entire market value rule for an entire accused product, and the producer of
that product has previously paid out substantial infringement damages or
licenses for the product, a court may very well be able to rule that no
reasonable juror could have found that the patent at issue accounted for the
entire market value.
Similarly, infringers should be allowed to present expert testimony
regarding the sources of consumer demand for the accused product. While this
practice might be expected to make trials longer and more costly, patent
litigation is by its very nature a long and expensive process which already
involves a great deal of expert testimony. The marginal cost in time and
expense of allowing additional testimony with respect to component value
would be insignificant compared to the overall cost of the case.
Another effective way to demonstrate consumer preferences is to question
consumers about their decision to purchase the accused device. A survey of the
accused infringer's customers could easily determine why those customers
chose that particular product. Again, courts have considerable expertise in this
sort of undertaking. In both trademark law and antitrust law, courts and juries
are often called upon to evaluate and weigh the results of consumer surveys. I I I
110. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 2041 (suggesting the admission of such
evidence is a general improvement to patent damages computation).
111. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 486-89 (5th
Cir. 2004) (considering survey evidence with respect to likelihood of consumer confusion in
trademark context); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1147, 1168-69
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At the very least, the entire market value rule should be modified to
prevent patentees from recovering damages based on unpatented components
that can reasonably be categorized as staple articles of commerce.1' 2 Such
components clearly have commercial value independent of the patented feature
because they may be readily bought and sold for noninfringing purposes. In the
context of our infringing PC hypothetical, this requirement would likely
exclude (at the least) all peripheral devices from the potential compensation
base because, thanks to widespread standardization in the computer industry,
they will almost certainly be interoperable with noninfringing computer
systems.
CONCLUSION
The goal of patent policy should be to compensate patentees for their
ingenuity, but not by more than is reasonably commensurate with the value
created by their inventive contributions. While commentators have criticized
the overcompensation inherent in the "reasonable royalty" measure of damages,
the entire market value rule is a particularly egregious and noticeable offender.
The economic model discussed in this Note demonstrates that the entire market
value rule systematically overcompensates patentees who own patents covering
only one component of a larger, complex device. As a result, the doctrine has
become a means for patentees to capture value that they did not create, at the
expense of innovative infringers, other patentees, and society at large.
The economic model discussed here suggests that patent reform measures
must turn back the clock on the entire market value rule and return the doctrine
to its rightful place as a special case of the apportionment requirement, rather
than a broad exception to that rule. Until courts abandon current doctrine and
apply the entire market value rule only when the patented component of the
accused devices truly accounts for the entire market demand for the infringed
device, patentees will continue to be unjustly rewarded. By making two simple
reforms-allowing accused infringers to present evidence in defense against
the doctrine's application that (i) reasonable substitutes for the patented
technology exist and (ii) unpatented components of the accused product have
independent economic value--courts can go a long way toward eliminating this
overcompensatory effect and, in the process, make the doctrine more coherent,
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (considering various types of introduced customer survey data in antitrust
horizontal merger analysis); see also Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354
F.3d 661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2004) (criticizing introduced survey data in antitrust market
definition context).
112. Courts have long recognized the need to prevent patentees from using patent
rights to control sales of unpatented staple articles. This idea is incorporated in the doctrines
of contributory infringement and patent misuse. See generally Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476 (1964); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 1374-75.
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predictable, and administrable. These reforms will help ensure that the patent
system encourages rather than impedes technological innovation in industries
which depend upon the continued development of complex devices.
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